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INTRODUCTION
For more than two decades, Congress and the President have pressed
administrative agencies to provide relief from unnecessarily burdensome
regulations and to provide greater accountability for agency decisionmak-
ing.1 According to one leading commentator, we may be witnessing the
emergence of a "cost-benefit state," in which governmental "performance
will be assessed, both in particular and in general, by comparing the costs
of government action against the benefits of government action."
2
In this climate, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC or Commission),
like other agencies, has "reinvented" its internal processes and reformed its
* Director, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission. The views expressed
herein are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Commission or any indi-
vidual Commissioner. The author is grateful to Ronald Bond, Stephen Calkins, and Paul
Pautler.
I. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,821, 3 C.F.R. 926 (1971-1975), reprinted as amended
in 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1994) (involving President Ford's call for systematic preparation of
inflation impact analysis); AL GORE, FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS: CREATING A
GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS, ACCOMPANYING REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE
REVIEW (1993) (implementing President Clinton's call to "reinvent" government); cf
American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 510-11 n.30 (1981) (identify-
ing statutes requiring cost-benefit analysis).
2. CASS R. SuNsTEN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 348 (1997).
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substantive regulations. The FTC is systematically reviewing old rules, and
when the review discloses they are no longer needed, is terminating them.
3
The FTC has incorporated "sunset" provisions into new orders and adopted
rules that will terminate existing orders after twenty years.4 New FTC rules
will simplify administrative processes, and a new "fast-track" procedure is
being used to complete major merger trials and other administrative cases
more quickly.5 In many ways - from guidelines to staff advisory opinions
to conferences and speeches - the FTC encourages private sector compli-
ance with its rules through means short of burdensome enforcement.6
This Article highlights an organizational feature of the FTC's approach
to regulatory reform, a feature that motivates what might be termed "con-
tinuous" regulatory reform by analogy to the process of continuous im-
provement ("kaizen") that is characteristic of Japanese manufacturing sys-
tems. 7 That organizational feature, which is nearly unique in government,
is the role played by the FTC's Bureau of Economics in internal agency de-
cisionmaking. Through the role of the Bureau of Economics, the FTC
nears one goal of contemporary economic regulation: the routine and
genuine application of cost-benefit analysis as a decisionmaking tool.
Section I describes the central role that cost-benefit analysis plays in
regulatory reform and describes the variety of means by which Congress
and the President have induced agencies to routinely employ cost-benefit
analysis in promulgating rules. Section II describes the types of costs and
benefits that should be evaluated in assessing the work of the FTC. This
section highlights the subtle but potentially large benefits to the economy
that result from the FTC's role as a referee for the private marketplace - a
role that synthesizes the Commission's competition (antitrust) and con-
3. In 1992, the Commission instituted a systematic regulatory review program to en-
sure that the continuing usefulness, benefits and costs of every Commission rule and indus-
try guide were reviewed at least once every ten years. As a result of this program, at least
eight rules have been repealed, and at least six have been amended to reduce compliance
burdens or to adjust for developments since the rule was issued. The program has also re-
sulted in the withdrawal or revision of nearly half of the Commission's industry guides.
4. See Policy Statement Regarding Duration of Competition and Consumer Protection
Orders, 60 Fed. Reg. 42,569 (1995); Termination of Existing Orders, 16 C.F.R. § 3.72(b)(3)
(1997).
5. Rules of Practice Amendments, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,640 (1996) (to be codified at 16
C.F.R. pts. 2-4).
6. See, e.g., Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 16 C.F.R. pt. 260
(1997); Dept. of Justice and FTC Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health
Care, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,153 (1996); Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of
Intellectual Property, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,132 (1995).
7. See Jonathan B. Baker, Fringe Firms and Incentives to Innovate, 63 ANTITRUST
L.J. 621, 631 (1995) (describing process as "incremental cost reduction" and "organizational
learning").
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Sumer protection missions. Section III describes how costs and benefits are
weighed at the FTC. Focusing on the institutional role of the FTC's Bureau
of Economics, this section argues that this organizational structure commits
the FTC to making economic analysis a routine part of the evaluation of
every enforcement matter and that doing so creates the functional equiva-
lent of conducting a formal cost-benefit analysis. The FTC also conducts
reviews of past actions in order to improve future decisions. By placing a
cost-benefit focus on every decision, albeit informally, the FTC's organiza-
tional structure institutionalizes continuous regulatory reform.
I. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN REGULATORY REFORM
Cost-benefit analysis plays a central role in contemporary political dis-
cussions of regulatory reform because it encapsulates the ideal that federal
agencies should comprehensively and systematically analyze the impact of
proposed actions in order to make informed choices and decisions.
8
Moreover, this methodological tool addresses some common criticisms of
agency decisionmaking from the political perspectives of both the left and
the right.9 For some, the attraction may be in leading agencies to focus on
costs as well as benefits. Agencies have a natural tendency to focus on the
good they can accomplish by correcting market failures. Cost-benefit
analysis encourages agencies to acknowledge the burden regulations place
on private actors and the possibility that government action can cause
costly, unintended consequences. 0 It leads agencies to focus on outcomes
8 See generally Economic Analysis of Federal Regulations Under Executive Order
12,866 (last modified Jan. II, 1996) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/OMB/html/
miscdoc/riaguide.html>.
9. Cf SUNSTEN, supra note 2, at 380:
At least since 1980, the executive branch has attempted to embrace a form of cost-
benefit analysis for specific purposes - to promote better priority-setting, to move
toward market-oriented tools, to exempt insignificant risks, to attend to informed
public judgements, to foster voluntary and least-cost compliance, and to focus on ul-
timate results rather than methods and processes.
To be sure, conservatives have embraced cost-benefit analysis more than liberals. Id. Some
liberal critics view cost-benefit analysis as a tool by which industry subverts critical envi-
ronmental, health and safety regulations. E.g., id. at 374 tbl. 14.1 (noting hostility of 1970s
environmentalism to cost-benefit analysis); MARK GREEN, WINNING BACK AMERICA 128-29
(1982) (overstating consistently costs and undervaluing benefits biases cost-benefit analyses
against appropriate, worthwhile public health regulation).
10. See, e.g., Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1981 (1986) (touting cost-benefit analysis as
way to increase political accountability and encourage more balanced regulatory decisions);
THOMAS 0. McGARrrY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS
IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 15 (1991) (presuming that "the goal of regulatory reform is
to bring comprehensive analytical rationality to bear on a preexisting rulemaking process
19971
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rather than solely on the regulatory method. Others may look to cost-
benefit analysis as a counter to rent-seeking: cost-benefit analysis calls on
agencies to look beyond the concerns of the most organized and politically
active interest groups and consider the impact of their decisions on the rest
of the polity."
Since 1978, executive branch agencies have been required to provide the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) with a systematic analysis of
major rules before they are promulgated. The first comprehensive re-
quirement was the product of the Ford-Carter era where the interest was in
streamlining regulations to make them less burdensome and more effective
and in employing incentives and other market mechanisms, rather than
command-and-control methods, to accomplish regulatory objectives. The
Carter administration's strategy called for regulation to be simple, clear, ef-
fective, and efficient, imposing no unnecessary burdens on the economy,
on individuals or organizations, or on state or local governments.' 2 Agen-
cies were charged with considering and analyzing alternative ways to
achieve their goals and then choosing the least burdensome ones identi-
fied.13 The Reagan administration revised this approach, principally by
adding the specific requirement that proposed rules pass a cost-benefit
test. 14 This requirement was also continued by the Bush administration.
The Clinton administration has restated similar goals, though it requires
consideration of a more comprehensive set of costs and benefits. 15 Under
the present scheme, regulations are to be adopted only if they are required
by law, necessary to correct market failures, or otherwise called for by
compelling public need. 16 In promulgating regulations, agencies must as-
sess the costs and benefits of alternatives, including the alternative of doing
nothing.' 7 The costs and benefits that must be weighed include both quan-
that has been dominated by techno-bureaucratic rationality"); but cf Alan B. Morrison,
OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99
HARv. L. REv. 1059, 1065 (1986) (criticizing implementation of Reagan-era Executive Or-
der mandating application of cost-benefit test to proposed agency regulation as going too far
in the reverse direction by "implement[ing] a myopic vision of the regulatory process which
places the elimination of cost to industry above all other considerations").
11. See DeMuth and Ginsburg, supra note 10, at 1081 (highlighting cost-benefit analy-
sis as way to consider needs of those other than interest groups).
12. See Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1979), reprinted as amended in 5
U.S.C. § 553 (1994).
13. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), reprinted as amended in 5
U.S.C. § 601.
14. Id.
15. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5
U.S.C. § 601.
16. 5 U.S.C. § l(a).
17. Id.
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tifiable measures and qualitative issues that are difficult to quantify, but
nonetheless essential.' 8 The Clinton program differs from its predecessors
chiefly in its explicit listing of a broad set of items that are to be considered
benefits: potential economic, environmental, public health and safety, and
other advantages, as well as distributive impacts and equity. 19 The overall
goal is the maximization of net benefits.
20
All of the approaches to rulemaking by the various administrations have
required a similar process of self-evaluation. Agencies are to identify the
problem to be addressed, the failure of private markets or other institutions
for example, and assess the problem's significance. They must determine
whether existing regulations have created or exacerbated the problem, and
thus whether changing those regulations might provide a solution. They
must identify alternatives to direct regulation, including using economic
incentives or providing information to encourage individual choice. Wher-
ever possible, they should specify performance objectives rather than pre-
scribe behaviors. Fundamentally, they must design regulation that is (1)
cost-effective, (2) tailored to impose the least burden on society consistent
with obtaining the objective, and (3) based upon "a reasoned determination
that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs.
21
Technically, the OMB programs apply only to offices and agencies
within the executive branch of government. They do not impose obliga-
tions on independent agencies such as the FTC. The principles underlying
these schemes, namely ensuring that regulation is effective and that bur-
dens as well as benefits are considered in making decisions, are, however,
of general application and value. Thus, it is not surprising that independent
agencies often conform to the requirements of executive orders in spirit, if
not precisely in form.
Notwithstanding this long bipartisan Presidential commitment to imple-
menting cost-benefit analysis, the activist Republican Congress, elected in
1994, called for even more cost-benefit analysis as one element of its broad
regulatory reform program.22 Congress may have believed that agencies
18. Id
19. The contemporary debate between liberals and conservatives over how to regulate
is increasingly framed not in terms of whether government actions should pass a cost-
benefit test, but rather over what the terms "cost" and "benefit" should include: should they
be limited to conventional economic data, or should they be understood more broadly, to
take into account the type of non-economic values incorporated in the Clinton Executive
Order? See SuNsTrN, supra note 2, at 380-81 (calling for terms to be specified "by some
theory of value").
20. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5
U.S.C. § 601 (1994).
21. 5 U.S.C. § 638(1)(b)(6) (1994).
22. See Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Movements, and the Cost-Benefit
1997]
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used cost-benefit analysis more for ex post justification than for actual de-
cisionmaking. Thus, the regulatory reform legislation that was proposed in
the "Contract with America" 23 required more stringent cost-benefit analysis
and risk assessment for a wider range of proposed regulatory actions.24
II. SUBTLE AND NOT-SO-SUBTLE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FTC DECISIONS
The value of applying an analytical framework like cost-benefit analysis
to regulatory decisions is demonstrated through a concrete look at the sub-
stantive work of the agency that the author knows best, the FTC. The FTC
is commonly considered a consumer agency in carrying out both its com-
petition (antitrust) and consumer protection missions. Thus, it might be
said that the principal beneficiaries of FTC actions are consumers. The
benefits of FTC actions are, however, more pervasive than what the "con-
sumer agency" concept implies.
The most immediate, direct beneficiaries of particular FTC actions are
indeed those individuals or firms that buy (or perhaps sell) in the affected
market. But the indirect benefits of FTC actions, namely the effects on all
consumers and producers in the rest of the economy, may substantially ex-
ceed the direct benefits. This is because keeping markets open and honest
reduces the private transaction costs of participating in market exchanges
and relationships, and thereby leads to greater economic growth. Lowering
transaction costs is much like replacing a ferry with a bridge: greater pre-
dictability, smoother operation, and decreased dependence on coordination
with others for each interaction lead to much greater output. Increased
marketplace activity benefits sellers and buyers alike, and benefits society
as well by increasing the ability of markets to put private property to so-
cially more valuable uses.
Three examples, from the areas of consumer protection, antitrust, and
public advocacy of competitive policies, will illustrate the breadth of the
social benefits that arise from FTC actions that keep markets honest and
competitive.
The first example, one of consumer protection, is Dahlberg Electron-
ics.25 At issue in this case was a hearing-aid manufacturer's advertisement
that its "Miracle-Ear" product helped consumers understand speech in
State, 48 STAN. L. REv. 247, 269 (1990) (remarking that "cost-benefit balancing dominated
the debate" in the 104th Congress).
23. Id.
24. See id. at 274-77, 290 (discussing importance of cost-benefit mandates in wide-
ranging regulatory reform efforts of the 104th Congress).
25. See Dahlberg Electronics, Inc., Complaints and Orders 1976-83, Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) N 21,163 (1976) (civil penalty consent order); In re Dahlberg, I Trade Cases (CCH)
70, 963 (1995) (enforcement of civil penalty consent order).
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noisy environments like restaurants. The FTC challenged the claim as false
and settled with the company,26 which paid a $2.75 million civil penalty for
violating an FTC order, and promised not to make the claim in the future.27
To illustrate that the benefit of this action was greater than merely the
transfer of funds to the Treasury of the United States, let us examine the
harm that would have ensued absent FTC action to stop this claim. First,
there would have been continued and direct harm to consumers who bought
the misrepresented product. Thinking they were buying a product that clari-
fied speech by reducing background noise, consumers would not have re-
ceived a product with those features. The direct harm to consumers here
would be that they spent their money without getting in return the value for
which they had paid.
The indirect harm resulting from a widespread and obvious failure to
take action against false advertising likely would be even greater, albeit
more subtle. False advertisements are the rotten fruit that can spoil the bar-
rel if not removed. The benefit of the FTC's action extends, at a minimum,
to the entire hearing-aid market. By stopping this firm from making false
representations, the FTC's action gives consumers confidence that similar
representations they encounter are likely true. More importantly, the im-
pact of clear and consistent action against false advertising extends beyond
hearing-aids to other advertised goods. Policing and prohibiting false ad-
vertising increases buyer confidence in advertising in general.
If there were no such policing of false advertising - if the FTC did not
exist2s - buyers soon would learn that not all advertising claims could be
trusted. Firms would have to find some other way to inform consumers
about the qualities of their products, and buyers would have to find other
ways to learn about the availability of products they might want or need.29
Cautious, wary buyers would buy less and waste expenditure on self-
protection. Sellers, in turn, would have to waste expenditure on less effi-
cient ways to prove their credibility. A principal benefit of having the FTC
26. See In re Dahlberg, I Trade Cases at 74,385.
27. See Dahlberg Electronics, Inc., Complaints and Orders, 1976-83 Trade Reg. Rep. at
21,078 (preventing company from claiming that hearing aids would "enable all persons with
hearing loss to consistently distinguish or understand speech in groups or noisy situations").
28. Although private actions for false advertising can be brought by competitors under
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1994), this remedy is unavailable to buyers.
29. Some marketplace responses can be imagined. For example, some retailers might
perform the role of certifying product quality, either by putting the product on their shelves
to share in the retailers' reputations, or perhaps by giving consumers a chance to sample the
product with a money-back guarantee. But these alternatives to advertising would be costly
for sellers. Sellers would have to convince a retailer to take their products before consumer
demand for them is demonstrated. Sellers might do so by persuasion, or by the equivalent of
payment; for example, by committing to pay for returned products.
1997]
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on the job is that it acts as a referee to prevent and remedy the kinds of dis-
tractions that disrupt the market.
The second example, one of an antitrust action, is the Time War-
ner/Turner merger."' This complex transaction would have created a
community of interest among the largest producer of cable television pro-
gramming, the largest distributor of that programming, and the largest op-
erator of cable television systems. The transaction was allowed to proceed,
but subject to a consent order.31 Because of the order, direct harms were
potentially prevented. For example, Time Warner might have charged ca-
ble systems higher fees for CNN and other marquee channels, and that
could have led cable systems in turn to charge higher prices to consumers.
Here again, however, the indirect harms that were prevented are also sub-
stantial. If the FTC had not acted, the merged firm could have kept attrac-
tive new channels that presented competition to Turner programming off
the air. This in turn could have reduced entrepreneurs' incentives to de-
velop creative new programming.
The Time Warner example illustrates a general point: permitting anti-
competitive practices tends to deter competition that is based on the merits
of the competing products or services. Such practices can discourage entry
into markets and innovation.3 2 To preserve these benefits of free and open
markets, a referee is needed. The FTC fulfills this role.
The third example, one of public advocacy of competitive policies, con-
cerns electric power. The FTC staff submitted comments to the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regarding FERC's proposed rule
to promote competition in the generation of electricity. 33  The FTC's
economists shared their expertise in the functioning of markets, and pro-
vided FERC with suggestions on more effective promotion of "open ac-
cess" to electric power transmission services. The direct beneficiaries of
30. See Time Warner, Inc., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) $ 24,104 (1997) (complaint and
consent order).
31. See id. at 23,911 (stating that Time Warner, Turner, TCI, and Liberty Media Corp.
"agreed to make a number of structural changes and abide by certain restrictions designed to
break down the entry barriers created by the deal").
32. See generally OFFICE OF PLANNING AND POLICY, FED TRADE COMM'N,
ANTICIPATING THE 21ST CENTURY: COMPETITION POLICY IN THE NEW HIGH-TECH GLOBAL
MARKETPLACE (1996); Richard J. Gilbert & Steven C. Sunshine, Incorporating Dynamic
Efficiency Concerns in Merger Analysis: The Use of Innovation Markets, 63 ANTITRUST L.
J. 569 (1995) (reviewing economic literature on effects of competition on innovation and
describing how innovation can be incorporated into analysis of mergers and acquisitions).
33. See Comments of the Staff of the Bureau of Economics of the Federal Trade Com-
mission, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities
and Transmitting Utilities (last modified Aug. 7, 1995) <http://www.ftc.gov/be/v950008.
htm>.
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FERC's pro-competitive action are buyers, including consumers, as greater
competition leads to lower electricity prices. The FTC staffs comments
also noted the indirect aspects of a system of open access. The comments
discussed how the system should be constructed so that vertically inte-
grated incumbents, which own both transmission and generation assets,
would be prevented from favoring their own operations and discriminating
against other firms' generation facilities. If that discrimination is pre-
vented, then entry is facilitated. Although FERC's final rule 34 did not adopt
all of the methods the FTC staff comments recommended, FERC appeared
to agree with the FTC staff about the nature of the basic problem, and
about the benefits that would flow from a competitive, non-discriminatory,
open access system.
Although the FTC produces clear benefits to the economy, to individual
consumers and even producers affected by FTC action, as these three ex-
amples illustrate, it also imposes some costs. The most obvious cost is the
FTC's annual budget. The more significant costs, however, are those borne
by businesses and others who are subject to the laws that the FTC enforces.
Many businesses that want to ensure their conduct complies with those
laws hire lawyers to advise them about how to do so, and may even change
their ways of doing business. Those businesses, and sometimes individu-
als, that have to respond to the FTC's law enforcement process, incur costs
in doing so. And if the FTC performs its internal cost-benefit analyses
poorly, its actions could chill efficient economic activity.
35
A few controversies have arisen over the years about the extent of the
costs that the FTC imposes. Twenty years ago, the Commission embarked
on the Line of Business reporting program. Proponents hoped to compile
disaggregated data about large firms' operations and profitability and then
identify competitively significant conditions and trends. Because so many
large firms were engaged in multiple, disparate businesses, public ac-
counting data was usually insufficient. Another reason for the program
was to test then-current economic theories linking industry structure to
business conduct and competitive performance. Many businesses, how-
ever, objected to the costs of providing the required information. After
34. See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities
and Transmitting Utilities, Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10, 1996), order on
reh'g Order No. 888-A, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,274 (Mar. 14, 1997).
35. Cf ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 4 (1978) (arguing that prior Supreme
Court antitrust decisions chill beneficial business conduct); Richard Craswell, "Compared to
What?". The Use of Control Ads in Deceptive Advertising Litigation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 757
(1997) (explaining inappropriate methodology for copy testing deceptive advertising allega-
tions could chill beneficial advertising claims).
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several years of controversy, the program was dropped, in part because of
the perception that the costs it had imposed exceeded the benefits of having
the information.36
At about the same time, Congress acted to reform and regularize the
FTC's rulemaking processes. The first reform, the Magnusson-Moss rule-
making amendments of 1975,37 established new procedures and gave the
Commission's consumer protection rules a stronger legislative base. One
reason for strengthening the FTC's rulemaking power was a belief that, in
the long run, it would cost less to develop clear rules about permissible be-
haviors through a rulemaking process rather than through time-consuming
and uncertain enforcement litigation. Just five years later, though, Con-
gress created new restrictions that made it more difficult for the Commis-
sion to issue rules.31 One of those requirements was to undertake a regula-
tory analysis of proposed rules, using language reminiscent of the
regulatory analysis requirements in executive orders that apply to executive
branch agencies.39 Congress even instructed the Commission to stop sev-
eral specific rulemaking proceedings. Congress was evidently responding
to complaints that the FTC's rules imposed undue costs on some busi-
nesses, particularly small businesses that were subject to them.4 °
Costs and benefits are often difficult to measure precisely. On this very
large scale - the benefits and costs of the agency as a whole - measure-
ment may be virtually impossible. But having a referee to keep markets
open, honest, and competitive is a prerequisite for a healthy, growing econ-
omy. By comparison, the costs of having the FTC in place, though real, are
undoubtedly modest by any reasonable estimate.
III. COMPARING COSTS AND BENEFITS AT THE FTC
A. Individual Enforcement Decisions
The most striking feature of cost-benefit analyses at the FTC is that, at
36. See generally F. M. Scherer, Sunlight and Sunset at the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, 42 ADMIN. L. REv. 461, 476-83 (1990) (reviewing events accompanying FTC's "sun-
shine" mandate and examining denouement of 1980s).
37. See Federal Trade Commission Act § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1997).
38. See Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94
Stat. 374 (1980).
39. 94 Stat. 388 (1980).
40. See generally Quentin Riegel, FTC in the 1980s: An Analysis of the FTC Improve-
ments Act of 1980, 26 ANTITRUST BULL. 449, 469-78 (1981) (recounting development of
several specific provisions of FTC Improvements Act of 1980); RICHARD J. PIERCE ET AL.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 43-45 (2d ed. 1992) (reviewing congressional oversight
practices of the FTC).
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least to outward appearances, there are none. Yet the Commission seeks, is
provided with, and uses the information necessary to determine whether
firm or industry conduct harms the public on balance, and whether a pro-
posed remedy increases economic welfare. This occurs in part because the
Commission has created an organizational structure and information-
gathering process that involves economists in every stage of substantive
decisionmaking, and gives them an independent voice in that process.4'
The roughly sixty-five Ph.D. economists in the FTC's Bureau of Eco-
nomics review and participate in every substantive matter before the Com-
mission. 2 The economist assigned to an investigation works in partnership
with the antitrust or consumer protection lawyers on the case. Together,
the legal and economic staff review documents, interview witnesses, de-
velop theories explaining how the conduct under review might be benefi-
cial or harmful to the public, and identify possible remedies. The economic
staff and the legal staff typically write independent memoranda to the
Commission evaluating the conduct at issue and recommending a course of
action. This is done both at an early stage in a major investigation, when a
decision to go forward is made, and at a late stage when the matter is ripe
for a final decision by the Commission.43 Although this does not describe a
conventional, formal cost-benefit analysis, the typical result of the process
- a Commission fully informed about costs and benefits when it makes
decisions - is roughly equivalent to it.
Economists provide the Commission with independent advice in both
competition and consumer protection cases. Their role is well entrenched
in antitrust. Indeed, economic analysis has become the essence of antitrust
in the courts and the enforcement agencies, independent of the political
party occupying the White House. Republican presidents have appointed
economically-oriented antitrust scholars like Judges Posner, Bork, Breyer
and Easterbrook to the circuit courts, and President Clinton has followed
suit by elevating Justice Breyer to the Supreme Court.
In antitrust matters before the Commission, the parties under investiga-
tion routinely hire economists to help them respond to the Commission's
concerns. Courts are led by antitrust precedent to evaluate the economics
of the conduct before them, often with the assistance of expert witnesses.44
41. See Report of ihe ABA Section ofAntitrust Law, Special Committee to Study Role of
FTC, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 43, 97 (1989).
42. Although the discussion below focuses on adjudicative matters, the economist's
role is similar in rulemakings.
43. In the event the matter proceeds to litigation, economists provide litigation support
and, in some cases, expert testimony.
44. See generally JOHN E. KWOKA & LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE ANTITRUST
REVOLUTION (1989) (providing examples of analyses economists undertake in antitrust
19971
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In consumer protection, the Commission relies on its economists to help set
the penalties it imposes on violators. The economic staff offers what is im-
plicitly a cost-benefit analysis by evaluating the proposed remedy against a
penalty derived from a method recommended by economic literature on
optimal deterrence.
A law-and-economics literature advises enforcement agencies on setting
penalties that achieve the right amount of general deterrence in the econ-
omy - penalties that deter harmful conduct by inducing efficient levels of
compliance expenditure by firms. This body of literature holds that if pen-
alties are limited to the levying of fines, agencies should set the penalties
by reference to the injuries the lawbreakers have caused third parties."'
The right penalty, conceptually, is the cost of the injury to the victim in-
creased by a multiple that is directly related to the detectability and diffi-
culty of proving the violation in court. The multiple is highest for the vio-
lations that are the most difficult to detect and prove, and lowest, near one,
for violations that are easily detected and proven.
The Commission may not adhere rigidly to this method of computing
penalties, in part because it frequently does not have the authority to assess
penalties. It may require consumer redress, but that amount would not be
subject to a multiple and hence is unlikely to be the optimal deterrent
amount. 46 Fencing-in relief may substitute for monetary assessments, but it
is often difficult to place a dollar value on the deterrent effect of such pro-
visions. Many defendants would lack the financial resources to pay the
penalty this calculation would require, so other deterrents are necessary. In
some cases, it is difficult to estimate the dollar value of the injury to the
victim. Nevertheless, computing the penalty with the use of multiples can
be instructive, because it implicitly provides the information that a cost-
benefit analysis would yield. Accordingly, the economic staff routinely at-
tempts to use this method in advising the Commission.
For example, our experience with computing penalties using the injury
times a multiple method suggests that the Commission should be extremely
tough in fraud cases because they often involve large consumer injury, and
because fraud is necessarily surreptitious and therefore commonly difficult
matters).
45. See Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169 (1968). If specific deterrence is instead the goal (deterring these particular law-
breakers), the penalty base would be the gain to the violator - a quantity often more easily
estimated than injury to the victims. Id.
46. For redress in cases of violations of Commission rules or practices covered by
cease and desist orders, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 57b(b), 57a(2) (1994). The Commission has also
routinely obtained equitable relief, including damages, rescission, and restitution, in actions
seeking injunctions under Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act. See Federal
Trade Commission Act § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 45.
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to detect and prove. The appropriate multiple may be large if fraud is sur-
reptitious. The resulting penalty target (injury times multiple) can be very
large.47
The economist's penalty model is also useful in assessing the costs and
benefits of seeking relief against agents as well as principals for deception,
such as in deciding whether to challenge an advertising agency in addition
to an advertiser in a deceptive advertising case. The economist's initial in-
stinct is that it should not matter who in the agency relationship is assessed
the penalty. The threat of penalty to either principal or agent is expected to
lead the contracting parties to arrange their affairs to avoid lawbreaking by
monitoring each other's compliance. But when one party in the chain can
more cheaply detect and prevent deception, deceptive advertising should be
deterred at the lowest social cost by imposing a monetary penalty or in-
junctive order on that party. Therefore, in a deceptive advertising case, the
Commission should focus on the advertiser when it has provided the ad
agency with unsubstantiated information. But when the advertiser and the
ad agency have developed ads together with correct information but have
conveyed the message so as to make the ad misleading, the ad agency
might reasonably be named as well as the advertiser.48
The independent analyses of proposed enforcement actions conducted by
staff economists have an indirect effect on Commission decisionmaking
that is at least as important as their direct influence on Commissioner
views. By institutionalizing an information-gathering and advisory role for
economists, the Commission has created a dialogue between lawyers and
economists during investigations that encourages the legal staff to under-
take a balanced assessment of costs and benefits before recommending
proposed enforcement actions. Thus, when a proposal seems likely to fail a
cost-benefit test, the Bureaus of Competition and Consumer Protection
commonly reconsider or revise their recommendation before forwarding it
to the Commission.49 Perhaps as a result, agency lawyers and economists
make identical recommendations to the Commission concerning the vast
majority of proposed enforcement actions.
47. Even when the Commission is unable to levy a fine, it can deploy an array of tough
remedies, including requiring consumer redress and tough fencing-in provisions, such as
bans on continuing in related businesses or bonds to provide the means for paying consumer
redress in the event violations continue.
48. Cf Ford Motor Co., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 24,012 (1996); Young & Rubicam,
Inc., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 24,012 (1996) (consent agreements accepted for comment
April 6, 1996).
49. See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, REGULATORY BUREAUCRACY: THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMIssION AND ANTITRUST POLICY 52-54 (1980) (describing how Commission's interest in
economic perspective encourages similar interest by legal bureau).
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B. Seeking Out Lessons from the Past
The FTC also tries to improve its performance by evaluating the effec-
tiveness of what it has done in the past. An example is an ongoing study of
a number of the Commission's past divestiture efforts. The Bureau of Eco-
nomics has combined forces with the FTC's Bureau of Competition to see
what can be learned about improving the prospects of successful restoration
of competition through divestitures. The preliminary results of this study
are instructive. They show that some respondents have been able to un-
dermine the FTC's ability to find a strong potential buyer or have hampered
the buyer's ability to succeed. That is, these respondents have used the di-
vestiture process to increase the costs of achieving the Commission's ob-
jectives.
Based on these preliminary results, the Bureau of Competition has im-
plemented new policies in negotiating consent orders. 50 The time permitted
for divestiture is shorter, and merging firms are encouraged to identify a
buyer when proposing settlement. These steps reduce the time in which the
merged firm will have control over the assets that it must divest, and help
the Commission ensure that the buyer is viable. If the buyer appears weak,
and the Commission staff has learned about potentially superior alterna-
tives during the investigation, the merging firms can expect some hard
questions about their settlement proposal.
In addition, proposed relief that requires discretionary post-divestiture
actions by the respondent, for example when the divestiture involves tech-
nology transfer or a supply contract, will be treated skeptically. In such
cases, "crown jewel" provisions are demanded, calling for divestiture of a
broader group of assets when the initial divestiture is not effected within
the prescribed time. Such provisions increase the respondent's incentive to
sell the initial package during the initial period. They also provide a big-
ger, and presumably more attractive, package for the trustee to market if
the respondent is unsuccessful. In order to enhance the stand-alone viabil-
ity of divestiture packages, proposals to divest a narrow package of assets
will also be treated with some skepticism. Instead, the required divestiture
packages may go beyond the narrowest conceivable set of assets that would
restore competition where there is a competitive overlap.
Another example of reviewing our experience to find lessons for the fu-
ture is a study conducted by FTC economists of three horizontal mergers.5
In one case, the FTC initially tried to prevent the merger but eventually
50. See generally George S. Cary and Marian R. Bruno, Merger Remedies, 49 ADMIN.
L. REv. 875 (1997).
51. See LAURENCE SCHUMANN ET AL., FED. TRADE COMM'N, CASE STUDIES OF THE
PRICE EFFECTS OF HORIZONTAL MERGERS (1992).
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dismissed its complaint. 2 The merger was allowed to proceed during the
litigation, subject to the requirement that the acquired firm be held separate
from the acquiring company.53 The study found that, during the period of
this "hold separate," prices for the product - corrugating medium used to
make cardboard boxes - increased in ways that indicated the exercise of
market power.54 But after the "hold separate" ended, prices declined.55
The likely explanation is that, while the "hold separate" was in effect, the
plant's managers ran the business with an eye to the buyer's long-run in-
vestment interest. But because the order prevented them from doing busi-
ness with the buyer, except at arms length, it was not possible to achieve
efficiencies that combined operations offer.56 The lesson drawn from this
is that a "hold separate" order may have unwanted effects, and thus should
be used with caution.57
The two other cases were also instructive about how the FTC's usual
merger analysis is likely to work. In one, the only two cement plants in
Hawaii combined to form what might appear to have been a "monopoly.
'58
Their prices, however, were disciplined by imports, and, in fact, fell after
the merger, probably reflecting the efficiencies of combined operations.5
This acquisition was not challenged by the federal antitrust agencies. In the
third case, a combination of firms producing titanium dioxide, a commod-
ity chemical used in paints, apparently led to a significant increase in price
that could not be explained by increased costs or other factors. 60 Despite
the relatively modest change in industry concentration, the evidence is con-
sistent with the merger having lessened competition in the U.S. market.
61
This acquisition was not challenged, but the FTC did block the next one in
the industry a year later.62
CONCLUSION
The contemporary role of economic analysis at the FTC had begun to
emerge by the early 1970s. 63 Since at least that time - two decades and
52. See id. at 13.
53. See id. at 12.
54. See id. at 27.
55. See id. at 29.
56. See id. at 16.
57. See SCHUMANN, supra note 51, at 16-17.
58. See id. at 35.
59. See id. at 36.
60. See id. at 76.
61. See id. at 77.
62. See id. at 4 n.7.
63. See KATZMANN, supra note 49, at 52-54.
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one Chicago school revolution in antitrust thinking ago - the FTC has
employed an organizational structure and information-gathering process
that gives it the information needed to determine whether firm or industry
conduct is harmful, taking into account both costs and benefits, and
whether a proposed remedy or penalty increases economic welfare. The
availability of economic advice has by no means ended disputes among
Commissioners, however, because enforcement actions often involve pol-
icy questions as well as technical issues about the probability and valuation
of effects.
Notwithstanding shifts in the political composition of agency leadership,
or fluctuations in the temperature of policy disputes (and resulting dis-
agreements over how to weigh evidence), the FTC has created an organ-
izational structure that helps it accomplish what cost-benefit analysis is in-
tended to provide. By creating a large role for the Bureau of Economics -
both in ongoing investigations and systematic evaluations of past regula-
tory efforts - the FTC attempts to achieve better results with fewer bur-
dens on private parties. Economic advice helps the Commission make in-
formed decisions in individual cases, target enforcement resources on the
most serious business practices, and focus compulsory process requests and
remedies to maximize net benefit to the public. Through the Bureau of
Economics, in short, the FTC attempts to conduct regulatory reform in
every individual case.
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